. Unfortunately, other studies counter this optimism, suggesting games are not effective in promoting attitudinal shifts (Cherryholmes, 1966; Garvey & Seiler, 1968) . Recent research continues to report inconsistent results and calls for a better theoretical model that will establish the conditions under which attitude change can be expected (Schumacher, 1997) . The present study is an attempt to answer that call.
During the 1980s, the senior author of this article conducted several experiments (Williams, 1980; Williams, McCandless, Hobb, & Williams, 1986; Williams & Williams, 1987) on simulation games and attitude change. In each study, participants read an account of a fictitious villain and then played a game in which they portrayed this same villain. In all instances, participants' attitudes became more favorable toward the villain. Ultimately, we proposed "Identification Theory" as an explanation for the conditions under which simulations can be expected to change attitudes. The gist of this theory was that individuals change attitudes if they identify with the character whom they represent in a simulation.
We now believe that this definition of attitude change is limited and that, accordingly, the version of Identification Theory we suggested was flawed. In earlier research, we confined the investigation of attitude change to the realm of affect (e.g., "After playing the game, I like this guy more"), giving no consideration to the cognitive and behavioral changes that are often the best indicators of attitude change (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) .
Attitude change and Multiple Identification Theory
When attempting to promote a significant revision in attitude, "feeling differently" about a topic is not enough. We want the change to extend beyond affect. We seek to alter cognitive beliefs and perhaps, most importantly, to change behavior. Accomplishing these goals necessitates a model of simulation design that includes procedures for creating attitude change that is apparent at cognitive and behavioral levels. To this end, we are suggesting a greatly revised version of Identification Theory that we call Multiple Identification Theory (MIT). This is a theory developed through the process of designing numerous simulations as well as through data we have accumulated in several published studies (Williams, 1980; Williams et al., 1986; Williams & Williams, 1987) and unpublished research. As did its predecessor, MIT asserts that games can change attitudes only when the simulations promote identification. However, MIT specifies three distinct forms of "identification" (affective, cognitive, and behavioral) that need to be built into a simulation to realize the depth of attitude change that may encourage players to modify their beliefs and, most significantly, their behaviors in the "real world."
Affective identification
Affective identification describes situations in which players become emotionally invested in the outcome of a game. These players care about doing well in the simulation and often bond with the character or group they are representing. Affective identification also "sets the stage" for learning throughout the simulation by creating the arousal that enhances comprehension and memory (Sousa, 1995) . A game design encourages affective identification by creating an environment in which it is easy for the players to become emotionally involved. Such an environment is present when a. Significant incentives are provided for the "winners" of the game; b. Specific victory and defeat criteria are stipulated so that players have a clear way of evaluating their performance; c. Players assume the name of a specific group or character; d. Players see a correspondence between their situation (resources, conditions, etc.) in the game and that of the "real-life" character or group.
Affective identification's contribution to attitude change. With affective identification, players rejoice in victories, feel anger when attacked, and are dismayed by failures. In such circumstances, the egodefensive reaction to justify one's position and actions frequently extends to the character or group so that players see them in a more favorable light. It was likely this phenomenon that accounted for the attitude change in our earlier research (Williams, 1980; Williams et al., 1986; Williams & Williams, 1987) . Beyond this, the emotion associated with affective identification fuels the desire to improve performance, making the simulation's lessons important and memorable for the players.
Cognitive identification
Cognitive identification develops when players identify the structure (design aspects and results) of the simulation they are playing with reality (e.g., they see the game as a true and accurate representation of the way things are). Although the accuracy of a simulation's structure is necessary for cognitive identification, it is not sufficient. Even if the structural basis is sound, cognitive identification may not occur unless the process of playing the game makes the match between the game's structure and reality apparent to the players. It is helpful, for example, for the Game Director to make observations during the play of the simulation as to why certain results or situations are happening, linking their occurrence to the realities of the scenario being gamed.
Cognitive identification's contribution to attitude change. To the extent that cognitive identification is realized, the lessons of the game will have "believability" for the players. In these instances, people create new schemes or beliefs consistent with the insights they have gained from the simulation. Conversely, if a game is designed to teach a principle at the expense of realism, players may learn the maneuvers necessary to win the game, but they are unlikely to alter their belief system because they lack confidence that the actions that work in the simulation will pay off in their real lives.
Behavioral identification
The final element of identification is "behavioral." It is behavioral identification that prompts people to translate their understandings into action. Behavioral identification flows from the learning players acquire from their own behavior and its consequences (making decisions, following courses of action, and experiencing the results) in the simulation. Simulations promote behavioral identification by providing opportunities for players to test out a wide range of strategic and/or tactical options and by offering feedback about the effectiveness of these approaches. It is important for players to feel that they have the freedom to make their own choices, and that their alternatives are not determined by arbitrary restrictions within the game. Additionally, postgame debriefings processing the events and outcomes of the simulation are helpful in establishing both behavioral and cognitive identification.
Behavioral identification's contribution to attitude change. If behavioral identification is achieved, players identify the simulation's lessons as "my experience" and "my decisions." Such insights carry the power of personal exploration and commitment, representing the deepest level of attitude change, and fostering the transfer of learning to situations beyond the simulation.
The three types of identification are a set of tools each designed to produce a corresponding indicator of attitude change (e.g., behavioral identification leads to behavioral signs of attitude change, etc.). We believe that a game promoting affective, cognitive, and behavioral identification within the minds of the players has the best chance of producing comprehensive attitude change. Table 1 summarizes MIT. The recommendations cited for developing each type of identification are a work in progress reflecting the experiences we have had in researching, designing, and implementing simulations. We would also note that the guidelines for achieving identification as well as the outcomes under "contributions to attitude change" are statements of ideal conditions that are hoped for but certainly not always attained.
Purpose of the investigation
In this study we attempted an initial assessment of the validity of MIT as a theoretical model of simulation design that can produce multidimensional attitude change. The attitude selected for study was "cooperation versus competition." Although this issue is important in any conflict situation, it holds special significance for political science, international relations, psychology, and anyone concerned with the promotion of cooperation and peace as alternatives to competition and aggression. We created a simulation (following MIT) for the purpose of promoting attitudes of cooperation over those of competition.
Method
Twenty-nine community college students at Maple Woods College (13 females and 16 males) volunteered for the experiment and completed the study. The participants were drawn from several disciplines, including American History, European History, and Psychology. Participants were told they could receive 7 points of extra credit in their class if their team was victorious in the simulation but only 2 points if their team was not.
Simulation
The simulation used in the study was entitled "OCEAN WIND." Because this was our initial investigation of cooperation and competition, we wanted to create a game that would simplify the players' process of choosing cooperative or competitive approaches. Though the game was loosely based on the struggle between Native Americans and European settlers, aspects of the simulation remained abstract and generic. For example, all tribes started with the same number of lands that were worth the same number of points. The tribes were also identical in power, resources, and goals.
Structure and flow of the game
Players were divided into six teams, each representing different Native American tribes. The Game Directors (the experimenters) managed the European settlers as a "nonplayer-controlled force" whose actions were determined by charts and die rolls. Every turn, each team received ten "power chips." Participants played their chips on the game board, which charted tribal land as well as territories seized by the Europeans. Teams played power chips to fight other tribes, to defend land (with or without allies) from the Europeans, and to purchase guns from the settlers. This last option constituted an "arms race," because the weapons acquired could only be used against other player teams. Unbeknownst to the participants, the Game Directors tallied the way power chips were employed, classifying their use as cooperative, competitive, or neutral. Teams played cooperatively when they spent chips to create alliances against the aggression of the Europeans. Competitive chip activities included attacks on other tribal teams and/or investments in guns to gain a military advantage over the other Native Americans. Finally, neutral chip play referred to instances in which players used power chips to protect themselves (only) from the Europeans but did not form alliances with other teams.
The results determining the players' victory or defeat in the game were revealed in three phases (short-term, intermediate, and posterity) that we designed as a "cascading time results" sequence. Short-term outcomes, representing 1 year of time, derived from the immediate effects of the way teams played their power chips. When the short-term actions were resolved, the Game Directors moved to intermediate results-the second wave of the cascading-results structure-reflecting the effects of teams' actions over a 5-year span. These results were less visible to players. The Game Directors referred to a chart to which players did not have access. The experimenters' selection of a particular chart stemmed as a consequence of the short-term actions taken by the players. For example, on turns in which competitive play dominated, the intermediate-results charts assumed a hostile climate among the tribes. In this case, the charts generated tribal raids and wars that triggered negative points for all players. Conversely, if the majority of chip play was cooperative, the intermediate charts postulated a supportive tribal environment, resulting in increased trade and contributing positive points to the teams. The Game Directors pointed out how these occurrences illustrated predictable results of situations in which people have either good or bad feelings toward each other. Participants learned that any gains they made through aggressive actions in the short term were often countered by negative point results during the intermediate phase.
The game spanned three turns of cyclic short-term and intermediate effects. results." Posterity results constituted the longest term of the cascading design, representing the consequences for tribes 50 to 100 years down the road. Once again (in keeping with the fact that the distant future is hard to see), only the Game Directors had access to these charts. These results were also based on the degree of cooperation versus competition that had existed in the game. The Game Directors explained the rationale for these charts to the players by citing historians (Nash, Howe, & Davis, 1994) who speculated that the fierce competition among tribes doomed the Native Americans to extinction. Similarly, the experimenters noted the writings of Dowd (1992) and Boyer et al. (1993) , who argued that had the Native Americans cooperated with each other they might have had the strength to coexist with the Europeans as an independent nation. The posterity results' tables followed these guidelines. The more competitive the game play, the greater the likelihood that, 50 to 100 years in the future, the tribes would (as in real life) be vanquished. However, if teams played cooperatively, the posterity tables provided a reasonable chance for them to survive as a unified Native American state. All results (shortterm, intermediate, posterity) were expressed as positive or negative points. Any team finishing the game with positive points was judged a winner; those finishing with negative points were designated as losers.
Attitude measures
We developed three attitude measures for this experiment. One dealt directly with the constructs of cooperation versus competition. The other two focused upon issues that research establishes as supportive of cooperative or competitive positions ("truth and trust vs. deception and mistrust" and "social view of conflict vs. individual view of conflict"; Fisher & Ury, 1983; Johnson & Johnson, n.d.; NEGOTIATION: The Basics, n.d.; Spangler, 2003; Wertheim, n.d.) . Cooperative approaches see others in a conflict as allies and advocate policies of openness and honesty. Cooperation also endorses a social perspective in which effort is made to understand the views and meet the goals of all.
In contrast, competitive strategies cast others as opponents who must be bested. Accordingly, a competitive paradigm emphasizes deception and mistrust, and adopting an individual or personal view of conflict in which only one's own perspective is important.
Construction of the tests
The initial phase in developing the instruments involved the collection of studentgenerated descriptors for each of the planned tests. Students (N = 129) drawn from four Liberty High School psychology classes, as well as several Maple Woods College courses, participated in this activity. In each case, participants were asked to suggest statements they believed someone would make who endorsed one of the two dimensions of each test (i.e. cooperation vs. competition, truth and trust vs. deception and mistrust, and social view of conflict vs. individual view of conflict).
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After assembling the student-generated descriptors, we ran a validity check to make certain each descriptor was perceived as a valid statement, not just by the participant who generated it, but also by the group as a whole. To do this, we established an element of construct or content validity for the items by asking these same students to rate each of the student-generated descriptors on a 1 (low) to 5 (high) Likert scale indicating their estimate of how strong an attitudinal stance a person would have who endorsed each statement. We chose the highest mean statements for each of the three tests to be included in the last stage of the test development. For all tests, no item with a mean below 3.8 was selected, and most items had means above 4. The final procedure in the test development united the two dimensions of each test into a combined instrument. We then administered these tests to another group of naive participants. After all the exams were scored, we conducted an independent t test (for each test), comparing the scores on every item of the top 25% of scorers on the entire test with that item's score as registered by the bottom 25% of scorers for the entire test. Based on the results of these measures, the tests were again refined. The final versions of each scale included only those items that had been shown to be effective discriminators (p < .05) between populations (high scorers vs. low scorers), differing in the degree to which they possessed the construct being measured.
Procedures
One week prior to the investigation, all participants completed the pretest of the three attitude scales. The study was run in two evening sessions totaling 5 hr of time.
In the first meeting, we explained the rules of the simulation and asked participants to complete (anonymously) a strategy form stating the tactics they planned to employ in the game. The participants then played the OCEAN WIND game. In their first experience with the simulation participants played aggressively and competitively, often attacking other tribes in an effort to acquire each other's land and the short-term victory points this control brought. At the conclusion of three turns, all teams had negative points and players received only 2 points of extra credit as opposed to the 7 they would have earned by winning (finishing with positive points) the game.
During the postgame debriefing, we asked participants to discuss the effects of their competitive strategies, noting examples from history as to how competition among Native American tribes hampered their resistance to European advances. We also linked "truthfulness and trust" and taking a "social view of conflict" as pillars of cooperative approaches. Similarly, we discussed how "deception and mistrust" and taking an "individual view of conflict" support competitiveness. We then asked participants to examine which of these behaviors they had used in the simulation and what the impact had been. During the group discussion, we asked all players to respond anonymously in written form to a series of "reaction questions" (some of these will be cited in the "Results" section), gauging their perceptions concerning what had happened in the game and what had been responsible for the outcomes.
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After all players had completed their reaction questions, we informed them that they would have a chance to replay the game the following week. We also noted that if they won they could substitute the 7-point bonus for winning for the 2 points they had received by losing the first play of the simulation. We then asked participants to discuss what, if anything, they would do differently. The players expressed their intention to try out a cooperative approach and we led them in a discussion of the potential problems they could encounter (e.g., one team refusing to cooperate, the difficulty of coordinating cooperative actions, etc.) and how they might respond to these pitfalls.
The second play of the game witnessed a change in player strategy and in result. Participants worked together to oppose the Europeans, and this cooperative strategy paid off as all teams finished with positive points, thus winning the game. In the postgame debriefing, we asked participants to offer explanations as to why things turned out so much better. Unanimously, participants credited greater cooperation as the reason for their success. We then asked players to discuss other areas of life in which they had witnessed the advantages of cooperative approaches. At the conclusion of the debriefing, participants provided written responses to several "reaction questions." They also completed another strategy form detailing what (after having had the experience of playing the game) they believed was the best way for the tribes to respond to the problems presented in the game. Finally, we requested all players to again complete the attitude scales, stating, "Sometimes playing a game will change the way you look at things; in other cases it will not and your views will stay the same. We are interested to see what happened here."
One week after the conclusion of the study, we were able to contact and meet with 24 of the 29 participants. We asked them to respond (anonymously) to the following questions.
1. All my responses to materials used in the study were accurate and honest: YES or NO. 2. Have you used any of the insights you gained regarding "cooperation versus competition," "truth and trust versus deception and mistrust," and taking a "social view of conflict versus taking an individual view of conflict" in your personal life as yet? If so, please give specific examples.
One week after this meeting, all participants were debriefed as to the full intent and findings of the study. Throughout the experiment, we attempted to fulfill MIT's requirements for developing the three aspects of identification it holds are necessary to change attitudes. Table 2 summarizes how these aspects were built into the simulation. Table 3 details the data that were collected to determine the effectiveness of the simulation design in achieving the various types of identification specified by MIT.
Results
Data were also compiled to determine the effectiveness of the simulation in achieving the various types of attitude change.
Affective indicator of attitude change
Question from postgame debriefing, Game 2 (5-point scale with 5 = strongly agree).
By playing the game I felt like the Native Americans must have felt and I gained empathy for them.
Mean rating for this question was 3.72.
Cognitive indicators of attitude change
Three dependent t tests were conducted comparing participants' Pregame 1 and Postgame 2 scores on the attitude scales. Higher scores on these instruments indicate more cooperative attitudinal positions. Table 4 presents these results.
The possibility of cognitive attitude change was also assessed by two qualitative measures.
1. Following the second play of the simulation, all participants completed a plot chart on which they noted their perception of the degree and direction (if any) of their attitude change. The plot charts were divided into 100 measured units and participants' scores were determined by measuring their dot placement with a ruler (Figure 1 ). Low scores indicated participants' belief that they had experienced an attitude shift toward views of competition. High scores indicated the perception that they had experienced an attitude shift toward views of cooperation. The minimum score (most extreme movement toward attitudes of competition) was zero. The maximum score (most extreme movement toward attitudes of cooperation) was 100. A score of 49 was the median score, indicating the participant's impression that he or she did not experience Question from postgame debriefing Game 2 (5-point scale with 5 = strongly agree): "The lessons the game teaches about the advantages of cooperation, truth and trust, and taking a social view of conflict are true in 'real life.'" Mean score for this question: 4.25.
Behavioral
Questions from postgame debriefing Game 2 (5-point scale with 5 = strongly agree): "By playing the game for two class periods I was able to learn for myself about the merits of cooperation and competition, as opposed to just being told something by the instructor." Mean rating for this question: 4.21.
"There were a lot of different strategies you could explore and try out when playing the game." Mean rating for this question: 3.62. any change in attitude during the simulation. The findings supported the conclusion that participants saw their attitudes as shifting in a cooperative direction. Table 5 displays these data. 2. Prior to the first play of the game, players were asked to write what they thought would be the best strategy to win the game. After playing the game twice, players were asked to again write their ideas as to the most successful strategy. In both cases, participant responses were anonymous. The experimenters scored the strategy forms independently. Only statements seen as clearly communicating a competitive or cooperative approach were counted. There was an approximately 95% agreement between the graders. Disputed items were not counted.
An analysis of participants' responses to Pregame 1 and Postgame 2 strategy forms suggests a trend toward beliefs favoring cooperation. The first strategy forms contained 31 statements endorsing a competitive strategy and 13 advising a cooperative approach. The final strategy forms provided 32 cooperative statements and zero competitive ones.
Behavioral indicators of attitude change
Several assessments investigated behavioral change. An analysis of the manner in which participants played their power chips during Game 1 and Game 2 supports the conclusion that participants shifted their behavior from a competitive to a cooperative strategy. Other measures also attested to behavioral change. Sample comments: applied insights from the "There was a conflict at work game to their lives that I had to solve and I had to look at both views and solve it the best way to benefit everyone." "Yes, I used cooperation in my work environment [restaurant] . Also, I have used it with my personal relationship [with my girlfriend] ."
Discussion
The results of the current study have important ramifications for those interested in the promotion of cooperation as opposed to competition and its frequent companion, aggression. Endorsing the value of peaceful cooperation is easy; realizing it is difficult. This issue is at the forefront in a number of fields ranging from peace studies to international relations to organizational management. The area of negotiation is typical. Many herald the advantages of integrative negotiation in which the parties work cooperatively to secure a win-win situation (Fisher & Ury, 1983; Spangler, 2003) . Unfortunately, integrative negotiation and cooperative attempts at conflict resolution remain elusive goals because we almost reflexively view the other party as "the enemy," and attack accordingly. Tajfel (1970) demonstrated the tendency of experimental participants identifying themselves as a "group" to favor a competitive and adversarial strategy in their interactions with other groups. The degree of this competition was so pronounced that participants preferred to assign reward points in a manner that maximized the difference between themselves and another group as opposed to assigning the greatest possible number of points to their group. (In other words, "I would rather beat you than do the best for me.") This attitude is echoed in our tradition of competing as "the American way" and the idea that a "good negotiator" is someone who holds firm and gets the best deal by vanquishing an "opponent." Tajfel and Turner (1979) explained our bias for competition through "Social Identity Theory" in which they speculated that the desire to improve self-esteem drives us to prove the superiority of our group by defeating or outperforming others.
Even when one is willing to approach negotiation with openness and cooperation, the other side often reads this as an opportunity to seize the advantage by responding aggressively. They are probably right. Lax and Sebenius (1986) noted that if one side cooperates and the other competes, the competitor tends to "win big" at the expense of the cooperator. Accordingly, when (as is typically the case) one is unsure about the other parties' strategy, the best alternative is a competitive one.
Given the fact that the dynamics of conflict situations favor competitive views and strategies, it may seem surprising that cooperation is ever achieved. However, Deutsch (2000) outlined the conditions under which cooperation can occur. Deutsch argued that in any dispute there is a degree of interdependence between the goals of the involved parties, and whether they cooperate in a conflict depends on the nature of that interdependence. Negative interdependence occurs when both sides believe that the chance of obtaining their goals is lessened if the other person or group realizes their objectives. This produces a "zero-sum" situation that usually results in competitive actions.
On the other hand, if people think that the likelihood of meeting their goals is increased by the successes of the other side, positive interdependence exists. Positive interdependence in turn leads to cooperation because of the mutual benefits it promises to all parties. A perception of positive interdependence will only occur if we are able to convince people that competition is not the best strategy and that peaceful cooperation yields more beneficial results. The design element of "cascading results" that we built into the OCEAN WIND simulation was our attempt at accomplishing this goal.
The design feature of cascading time results
The philosophy of cascading results is (as noted earlier) that the effects of our actions transpire over time. Short-term results are the easiest to see. In the initial play of OCEAN WIND players centered their attention on these immediate (representing 1 year of time) payoffs, and aggressive strategies were the norm. This approach was consistent with numerous statements on the players' pregame strategy forms revealing that most participants saw a negative interdependence of goals and planned to win by taking land from other teams. During this short-term phase, teams were at times able to earn positive points through competitive actions. However, a competitive environment resulted in a disruptive intertribal climate. Such a climate generated events that produced a great number of negative points for players during the intervening-years phase (a 5-year time span) and also during the posterity (50-to 100-year time span) phase. The end result was that all teams finished the simulation with negative point totals and lost the first play of OCEAN WIND. Following the postgame debriefing, the second play of the game was much different as the teams worked together in a cooperative strategy that led to all of them winning. We believe that the marked change in player strategy (moving from competitive to cooperative) observed in the two plays of the OCEAN WIND simulation occurred because (following the theories of Deutsch) players changed their perception of interdependence from negative to positive. Specifically, the use of cascading results and, in particular, the intervening-years and posterity phases demonstrated to participants that, viewed from a proper perspective (that includes a focus on the long term), the goals of the tribes could be seen to be positively interdependent. Furthermore, we suggest that this understanding resulted in a greater social consciousness by which the tribes saw themselves as an interconnected whole, abandoning the "outgroup" discrimination that Tajfel (1970) identified as a trigger for aggressive and competitive actions Players perceived realism of cascading results. We developed the cascadingresults design to teach players the benefits of cooperation. However, one should recall that a key principle of MIT is that a game will be effective in changing attitudes only if players see the rules and structure of the simulation as "true to life." Our confidence that cascading results met these criteria of realism stemmed from the common claim that many understandings require a long-term perspective (Advanced Negotiation Training, n.d.; Strategic Restructuring, 1998) . Just as the health hazards of smoking are frequently realized only in midlife, so too the negative consequences of competition, as well as the full values of cooperation, are seen in greatest clarity through farsighted lenses. The ability of simulations to telescope time, teaching the lessons of years in a matter of hours, makes them an ideal vehicle for this purpose.
Though many agree with our beliefs in the realism of intermediate and long-term results (Advanced Negotiation Training, n.d.; Strategic Restructuring, 1998) , it was critical (according to the requirements of MIT) that the participants shared this perception. Several measures indicate they did. Player responses to questions concerning the realism of the simulation yielded a cumulative score for both plays of the game of 3.95 on a 5-point scale (see Table 3 ). Participants rated the realism of the cascadingresults system even higher, scoring it 4.15 (both plays combined). It is encouraging to note that the players' view of the game's realness was not lower in Game 1 (when they lost the game) than it was in Game 2 (when they won the game). In our experience,
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this finding is unusual. Losers of a game tend to rate it as less valid than do winners. The fact that this did not occur in our study is a good sign that the players considered the game's structure authentic. We find more support for this conclusion in participants' responses to the statement, "The lessons the game teaches about the advantages of cooperation, truth and trust, and taking a social view of conflict are true in 'real life.'" The mean score for this question was 4.25 on a 5-point scale (5 = strongly agree).
Evidence of attitude change
In addition to establishing a perception of realism, we believe that the simulation prompted players to change attitudes. The most important cognitive indicators of attitude change were the dependent t tests for all three attitude scales (cooperation vs. competition, truth and trust vs. deception and mistrust, and taking a social view of conflict vs. an individual view of conflict). These tests indicated a movement toward the desired dimension of cooperation. In each case, the pretest-posttest comparisons of participant scores were significant and the effect sizes were of at least moderate strength (see Table 4 ). The comparison of participants' "strategy forms" reveals a similar transition from competitive and/or aggressive to cooperative and/or peaceful intentions. Players' self-ratings on plot charts coincide with the other assessments, suggesting that after playing the game, the participants saw themselves as becoming more favorable toward cooperative positions.
The argument for behavioral change is also supported. During the play of each game, teams took actions by playing power chips. The Game Directors tracked the play of these chips recording their use as competitive, neutral, or cooperative. In the first game, teams played competitively (chi-square = 126.03; p < .01). However, after losing the first simulation, players' tactics changed profoundly and 100% of the chips in the second run of the game were used cooperatively.
Tentative indication of behavioral change is also found in our investigation of the degree to which players reported transferring learning from the game into their personal lives. Immediately after the second play of the simulation, participants responded with a mean of 3.47 (5 = strongly agree) to the statement, "I am likely to apply the lessons the game teaches about the advantages of cooperation, truth and trust, and taking a social view of conflict to my own life." One week after the study's conclusion, 10 of the 24 participants contacted by the experimenters reported that they had used some of the insights regarding cooperation gained in the game in their personal lives (see Table 6 ). It should be noted that none of the participants had any prior knowledge that he or she would be contacted after the study, or that he or she would be questioned about whether they had actually applied information from the experiment to their lives.
The scope of attitude change. Though some of our assessments measured participants' attitude change (cognitive and behavioral) regarding the scenario being gamed, others had a broader focus. The attitude scales, for example, had nothing to do with the OCEAN WIND simulation, centering instead on more widespread attitudes toward cooperation. We find it noteworthy that an analysis of results suggests attitudinal
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change both for the simulation scenario (strategy forms and patterns of power chip play) and also for participants' generalized view of cooperation (attitude questionnaires and participants' poststudy reports of transferring game insights to their lives).
Evidence supporting the validity of MIT
This experiment also constitutes a small step in establishing MIT as a guideline for game design that can produce attitude change. The method section detailed how the OCEAN WIND game incorporated the principles of identification stipulated by MIT. Data collected during the investigation (Table 3 ) support the conclusion that the three forms of identification were realized.
Obviously, the application of the MIT system is not limited to the constructs of competition and cooperation. If other investigations yield data similar to this study, organizations and businesses might someday use MIT as a template for creating simulations that impact a wide range of affective, cognitive, and behavioral positions.
The work with MIT reinforces our conviction that one cannot just "throw a game" at a situation and expect good results. Simulations must be crafted to fit a purpose and the particulars of the game design are a salient variable in determining the success or failure of a simulation in achieving its goal.
Further research
Although we are encouraged by the outcomes of this study, we are very much aware of its limitations. Before we can accept the findings of our investigation as anything more than promising, additional and confirming studies must be conducted. Future research should investigate evidence of long-term as well as short-term attitude shift. It would also be helpful to explore the possibility of gender differences. We should also remember that the OCEAN WIND simulation was designed as a generic conflict. As such, it lacks the individuality and complexity that would be found in a game created to match a specific conflict scenario. Once players of OCEAN WIND decided to cooperate, the mechanics of making this happen were straightforward and relatively easy to attain (e.g., playing chips cooperatively involved using them against Europeans as opposed to other Native American tribes). Games designed to portray a more realistic environment are not so accommodating. An appropriate analogy might be that of a tennis player. You learn to hit a new stroke successfully against the ball machine that obligingly places its shots at a set speed and location. Unfortunately, once you take your game to the court, all sorts of variables get in the way. The wind shifts the flight of the ball, the sun gets in your eyes, and there is that nasty opponent who delights in hitting it "where you ain't." If you are to be a good tennis player, you have to be able to adjust to the circumstances of a given setting. The same holds true for our prospects of achieving cooperative solutions.
Future studies need to determine if the results obtained in this experiment can be duplicated in games designed to simulate a specific real-life conflict. In these cases, successful cooperation requires not only the decision to cooperate, but also the "skills of implementation" to fight through barriers and realize the goal.
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Conclusions
We began this study with the hypothesis that a game designed by the guidelines of MIT would prove successful in changing attitudes in a cooperative direction. The data suggesting this happened constitute preliminary validation of MIT as a system of game design that can impact attitudes. The importance of this possibility is heightened because the particular attitude change that occurred (moving from competition and aggression to cooperation) holds relevance for many areas of our lives.
The previously cited observation that the OCEAN WIND simulation altered attitudes not only for the scenario being gamed, but also in a more comprehensive way is also significant. This result intimates that simulations designed via MIT might (pending corroborating research) help us replace attitudes of competition and aggression with those of cooperation in two ways. First, a game could be tailored to promote a cooperative solution to a specific situation. If the resolution of the issue were critical, such a tool could prove valuable for those in areas as diverse as political science, conflict resolution, negotiation studies, international relations, psychology, peace studies, and organizational management. Secondly, we could even hope that by playing such simulations, participants will experience a more generalized shift toward cooperation, becoming people who have the will and the skill to apply cooperative solutions to a variety of problems.
